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Abstract
The world has dramatically changed over the last decade.
Almost every aspect of our lives is being digitally monitored:
from our social networks activity, through online shopping
habits to healthcare and financial records. The emergence of
Internet of things and the growing presence of cyber physical
systems only increase citizens’ exposure to digital monitor-
ing by commercial enterprises. In order to maintain citizens’
right for privacy while still encouraging an evolving digital
economy, people should be given the right to choose where
their data is stored and who holds it, a currently unattainable
privilege. We propose that through the revolution of comput-
ing infrastructure, enabled by new computing architectures,
a healthier competitive environment can thrive. In this en-
vironment, companies will compete for customers, offering
privacy and information control as a service. Such competi-
tion, when supported by regulation, will empower citizens,
allowing them to take back control of their data.
Keywords— Computing Infrastructure; Data Control; Pri-
vacy; Citizen Empowerment.
1 Introduction
The most important piece of information we hold during our
lifetime may be our personal information. Information on
who we are, what we like and dislike, health and financial
records as well as family ties and friends: our personal in-
formation defines us. For this reason, privacy is an important
concern in today’s digital era, where every aspect of our lives
is collected and analysed.
Research exploring ways to take back control of our
data is considerable (e.g. (Heath et al., 2013; Haddadi et
al., 2015)). The importance of data protection has not es-
caped the eyes of legislators, and regulation such as General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been set in motion.
While legislation covers aspects ranging from the handling
of collected data to responsibility, accountability and con-
sent, it does not cover the users’ ability to choose where their
data is stored.
While users today can choose not to use the services of
giants such as Google, Facebook or Amazon, such a choice
has implications on the daily lives of the users, and their
ability to interact with others. It is rarely noted, however,
that the growth of these powerful corporates was fuelled by
a technological gap: the lack of hierarchical computing in-
frastructure.
In this paper, we assert that better control of our personal
data can only be achieved through a revolution of computing
infrastructure. We propose a model for scaling computing
infrastructure, where more and more companies can become
part of the infrastructure and where competition between
these companies strives. Under such conditions, privacy and
information control will become a service, and citizens will
have the power to choose how their data is handled.
2 Motivation
Health records are becoming a dominant factor in the de-
bate on progress versus privacy. Already a decade ago
Google offered Google Health as a mean to collect, store,
and manage medical records online (Mayer, 2008). While
Google Health failed, DeepMind Health (DeepMind, n.d.)
is a more recent Google initiative, aiming to help clini-
cians provide better care. Other cloud service providers
also offer health related services, such as Salefoce’s Health-
Cloud (Salesforce, n.d.) and Microsoft Health (Microsoft,
n.d.). Amazon and Merck even initiated the Alexa Diabetes
Challenge (Luminary Labs, 2017).
While using technology to improve our health is a bless-
ing, the way that it is done needs to be questioned. For Ex-
ample, in July 2017 the Information Commissioner Office
(ICO) ruled the Royal Free NHS Foundation Trust failed
to comply with the Data Protection Act when it provided
patient details to Google DeepMind (Information Commis-
sioner’s Office, 2017). In this case, no less than 1.6 million
identifiable patient records were shared with Google without
explicit patient consent. While here data was shared with
Google by a different party, in many cases users knowingly
share their health information, e.g. using Internet of Things
(IoT) devices for health monitoring. This data is shared with
the application, which stores and processes it in the cloud.
The physical location of the data, e.g. in which data centre
the data is stored, is not a parameter a user can control.
The problem is not limited to health records: voice assis-
tants, such as Apple’s Siri, Amazon’s Echo, Google Home
and Microsoft Cortana record your voice and store some or
all of the data in the cloud (Moynihan, 2016). All around
us, every piece of data that can be collected is stored in the
cloud. This means that the few companies that physically
store the data hold tremendous power over our lives (Powles
& Hodson, 2017). While there is no immediate alternative,
emerging computing architectures do offer better means to
take back control of our data.
3 Computing as an infrastructure
Infrastructure is the basic physical and organizational struc-
tures and facilities needed for the operation of a society or
enterprise (Oxford English Dictionary, 2017). Infrastructure
has greatly evolved over history: from roads and canals in
ancient history to more recent railways, electricity and water
and sewage systems. Communication infrastructure, includ-
ing telephony and Internet, are more recent additions.
While computing is at the base of digital economy, it is
currently not an infrastructure (Infrastructure and Projects
Authority, 2016). Any type of infrastructure mentioned
above is deployed at varying scales and for varying needs
(e.g., a 4-lanes interchange on a motorway vs. a mini round-
about in a rural area). In contrast, computing is deployed
only at the edges: the end-user and the cloud provider.
Today, data generated by users is streamed to the cloud,
where it is processed and stored. It is a directly linked ser-
vice, with no computation provided along the way. Simi-
larly, computing equipment is designed to handle data only
on these two extremes of scale: either user size (IoT, mo-
bile devices and servers) or cloud-size (data centre). Any-
thing in-between is a simple aggregation of equipment, e.g.
a rack of servers, unsuitable to process scaling amounts of
streamed information.
The state of computing infrastructure stands in a stark
contrast to the complementing networking infrastructure.
Networking infrastructure scales from low-end user equip-
ment to high-end data centre networks, with different types
of equipment and technologies at each scaling point. Net-
working infrastructure does not only scale in equipment: it
also involves many service providers along the way, with
known rules applying to the way traffic is treated (Gao,
2001). A result of this construct is a large number of net-
working infrastructure players, and while some of them
are very large, no single corporate dominates the market.
Furthermore, the large number of competitors allows users
to freely select their networking service providers from
amongst a wide set of choices, and the providers compete
to obtain new clients.
Not treating computing as an infrastructure has long last-
ing effects on users’ experience, also in terms of resilience
and political climate effects. The distributed denial of ser-
vice attack on Dyn in 2016, a US based company, affected
European services, such as those provided by the BBC or
the Swedish Government (Chiel, 2016; Westerholm, 2016).
While not a direct example, this shows the worldwide de-
pendency on services located in other countries. Political
disputes or accidents (e.g. submarine optic fibre cut) can cut
citizens from both essential and convenient services hosted
in the cloud outside their country.
Legislation already puts limitations on cross border data
flow (Cory, 2017), and the Parliament is concerned by the ef-
fects of Brexit on free data flow (House of Lords, European
Union Committee, 2017). The solutions, however, focus on
building data centres locally rather than on changing exist-
ing paradigms. The interests of users will never come first
as long as data centre providers control the information, no
matter if their data centre is situated locally or abroad.
4 Scaling computing infrastructure
The need for a scalable computing infrastructure has not
been unnoticed. The introduction of 5G networks, in partic-
ular, has driven mobile providers to explore solutions to the
increasing load and requirements from their networking in-
frastructure, combined with computing needs. Fog Comput-
ing (Bonomi et al., 2012), and Mobile Edge Computing (Hu
et al., 2015) which advocate pushing computing to the edge,
is a move at the same direction as networking. However,
Fog Computing currently focuses on the Enterprise market
(e.g. (OpenFog Consortium Architecture Working Group,
2016)) and IoT rather than the personal user, and does not
provide the technological leverage required to transition the
infrastructure.
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Figure 1: Scaling computing infrastructure: from the local
compute resource, to the data centre.
The Computer As Network (CAN) architec-
ture (Zilberman et al., 2016) proposes a new server-level
computer architecture that attends specifically to the chal-
lenge of scalable computing infrastructure. It is based on
the insight that scalable computing infrastructure cannot
strive without attending to the increasing performance
gap between networking and computing (Zilberman et al.,
2015, 2016). CAN bridges the performance gap between
networking and computing by borrowing ideas and prac-
tices from the networking world, to address the challenges
presented by computing. The architecture explicitly puts a
networking-fabric at the core of the computing device, and
treats every I/O transaction between elements in the system
as a networking transaction.
The fundamental revolution proposed by CAN is the abil-
ity to build “Tiny Terabit Data Centres” in a box, at a cost
that is at same scale as a standard server. This means that
providing computing infrastructure will not require data-
centre scale equipment anymore, nor the financial invest-
ment required for such. Compute equipment can be located
as close to the home as a local network cabinet used in e.g.
Fibre To The Cabinet (FTTC), with scaling capabilities at
each point-of-presence in the hierarchy (as demonstrated in
Figure 1).
Promoting such scalable computing equipment is manda-
tory. This can be done in a manner similar to the Open
Compute Project (Open Compute Project, n.d.) (promot-
ing computing equipment for the cloud) or Telecom Infra
Project (Telecom Infra Project, n.d.) (promoting telecom-
munications equipment). The key aspect here will be the
cost, both in terms of investment and maintenance. A low
cost, low power solution will allow easy deployment and a
minimal financial commitment and enable a large number of
companies to become players in the market.
5 Citizen empowerment model
A large number of new competitors, whether small or
medium size, providing computing infrastructure services
opens a completely new set of possibilities for the personal
user. It will revolutionize the way we treat cloud computing
and applications: while today we choose the application, and
that automatically implies the compute service provider, in
the new model we will choose the compute service provider,
and the provider will imply the available cloud-based appli-
cations.
To make an analogy, this is similar to selecting a televi-
sion provider (e.g. BT, Sky or Virgin), where the selected
provider sets the television channels available and the shows
that one can watch, and the customer can choose to contract
with more than one service provider to gain access to addi-
tional channels (e.g. Netflix, Amazon).
An example of such new infrastructure entity is a “neigh-
bourhood cloud”: a local compute resource, located in the
user’s vicinity and being able to collect information from
tens to hundreds of thousands of devices, while maintain-
ing privacy control per data stream and complemented by
software solution (e.g. as the software platform proposed
by (Haddadi et al., 2015)). With the increasing number of
sensors and IoT devices used, such a resource will support
hundreds to thousands of neighbours - a small number on
a city scale. The implication of a neighbourhood cloud is
that users will no longer be required to store e.g. their health
monitoring information (from IoT devices, pace makers etc.)
in an unknown location, as all the information can be stored
and processed locally by a provider they choose.
A large number of service providers also means a health-
ier competition, and providers can propose different privacy
policies for data control rights to the users in order to draw
their attention. Beyond application packs, providing the
users with a platform to install their own applications is not
a technologically challenging task, and approaches to doing
so securely can be adapted from the data centre model (e.g.
(Khan et al., 2013; Baumann et al., 2015)).
It is not unexpected that new computing paradigms will
also call for community or non-profit organisations led
neighbourhood clouds. Where the cost of installing the
equipment is low, and the trust between the user and the
compute provider must be high, such initiatives are likely
to gain the support of many people. Even when mainte-
nance and support are taken into account, the success of
community driven models, such as the Raspberry Pi foun-
dation (Raspberry Pi, n.d.) is indicative.
Assuming that enabling a choice of data storage location
and competition will empower citizens is not a myth. Com-
panies such as Facebook and Google depend on the size of
their user base, and the information gained from the users is
key to their success (Ezrachi & Stucke, 2016). By sharing
less information with these giants, users create a healthier
and safer environment for themselves, and take back control
of their personal information.
It is the government’s place to enable the competitive and
regulated environment required for the success of comput-
ing infrastructure. The most likely model is the one used
for communications, and it is expected that many companies
providing communication infrastructure will want to offer
computing services as well. Yet, as computing differs from
communications, the two should not be treated as identical.
6 Discussion
Turning compute into an infrastructure was not practical un-
til recently. In part, the change is contributed to the emer-
gence of lower power and lower cost processors at the core
of high performance servers (Malik & Homayoun, 2015;
Shahrad & Wentzlaff, 2017). The economic model is a key
factor here, as the vast number of systems that need to be
deployed dictates a low cost solution to be a mandatory re-
quirement.
Another element required is isolation of users and re-
sources. In communication infrastructure this is already
provided, guaranteeing quality of experience and as an en-
abler for shared wireless services. In computing, however,
resource isolation is still the source of considerable study,
especially where high performance systems are involved
(e.g. (Banga et al., 1999; Angel et al., 2014; Burns et al.,
2016)). For computing infrastructure to succeed we need
to apply networking practices to compute (Zilberman et al.,
2016) while maintaining easy management, low cost and a
strong isolation between users.
One may question why computing as an infrastructure is
required. Beyond current technological limits, why isn’t
home compute equipment sufficient. However, personal
computing equipment sales (including desktops, notebooks
and laptops) have been steadily declining over the past five
years (Gartner, 2016; Statistica, 2017) as people move to
cheaper, lighter and more accessible mobile devices. It is
unlikely that people will buy new compute equipment when
they can get the same services for what seems to be free. The
understanding that current services are not free, as you pay
with your personal data, is growing but have not yet reached
a critical mass (Van Dijck, 2014).
Privacy is the priority requirement from computing infras-
tructure. While currently governments have limited control
over cloud service providers and application designers, it is
much easier to control privacy related aspects in a locally
regulated environment. As an example, if it is forbidden by
law to allow private data beyond the first compute unit, local
companies will have an incentive not to share it further and
the government will find it easier to enforce the law. This
is contrary to the common model where companies provide
services for free in exchange for personal data that they later
sell (Brustein, 2012), and where governments find it hard to
deal with global conglomerates.
New advancements in security, such as homomorphic en-
cryption, may further contribute to aspects of user privacy
while running applications on a computing service. While
new computing infrastructure will likely create new cyber
security threats, it can also help addressing different cur-
rent threats. As an example, a Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack is not effective when the target services are
physically distributed, reducing the effect of a single (or a
few) points of failure.
Not all applications fit the proposed models: social net-
works, for example, are likely to continue running in the
cloud, as they aggregate information from many users. Elec-
tronic mail services, on the other hand, can operate just as
well when located close to the user. Sensor based appli-
cations and applications sensitive to latency are the leading
examples of applications best placed close to the user.
7 Conclusions
The world is rapidly changing. More and more data that we
consider to be personal is held these days by a third party,
stored in locations unknown and uncontrolled by users.
Leaving our most precious data in the hands of entities we
cannot choose or control is of utmost concern. In this paper,
we proposed a radical rethinking of data control paradigms,
by allowing users to choose where their data is stored and
who handles it. We assert that this paradigm can come true
only by treating computing as an infrastructure. The vi-
sion is enabled by new computing architectures, proposing
low cost, high performance platforms. Where computing
becomes an infrastructure, it allows new competitors to en-
ter the market and a wide offer of privacy-preserving cloud-
compute services to the user. Citizens will be able to take
back control of their data, as well as a foundation of our so-
ciety: the right to choose.
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